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Money and Manpower in Graduate Medical Education
David C. Leach, MD*

T

he United States spends approximately $425 billion on
health care annually (1). The direct cost of graduate medical
education is estimated to be $3 billion (2), which includes salaries and benefits for housestaff, faculty teaching time, medical
libraries, and other overhead associated with housestaff. Given
that $3 billion is a substantial amount of money, graduate medical education has received an inordinate amount of attention in
recent months, and its funding has been challenged by a variety
of payors (3,4). The reasons for this extend beyond the direct
cost of graduate medical education and include issues of physician manpower (are we training too many specialists?) and the
established observation that teaching hospitals are costlier
places to do business than nonteaching hospitals.
This article will make four points. First, only a fraction of the
additional costs of operating a teaching hospital is attributable to
teaching, and elimination of teaching programs will not eliminate those costs. Second, the accrediting bodies charged with
defining the uniform requirements of specialty certification are
completely dissociated from the funding mechanisms supporting those educational programs. This results in hospitals being
required to do more with fewer resources. Third, politicizing the
graduate medical education process is hazardous because it generates an urgency for short-term solutions which in the long mn
may prove to be both costly and detrimental to the alleviation of
human suffering. Fourth, the manpower issues bantered about
by politicians and physicians alike may actually be pseudo-issues. A physician surplus will exist when one position in any US
medical school goes unfilled for lack of interest. Any other definition is either politically orfinanciallymotivated.

The Cost of Teaching Hospitals
» In 1983 the Commonwealth Fund convened a task force that
examined the financing of graduate medical education (2). A
comparison of the operating costs of 115 major teaching hospitals with those of 4,726 nonteaching hospitals disclosed that
teaching hospitals are much more costiy places to do business.
The cost per discharged patient in nonteaching versus teaching
hospitals was $1,865 versus $4,221, a $2,356 difference. Only
$637 or 27% of this difference was due to the direct and indirect
costs of education; $1,719 or 73% of the difference was due to
other factors such as the cost of an urban location, higher wages,
severity of illness, complexity of illness, need for technological
support, larger percentage of indigent care and poor payors
(such as Medicaid), and greater social severity (destitute people
stay in hospitals longer because they have no place else to go).
These factors, which legitimately increase costs in teaching hospitals, traditionally have been recognized by most payors. In the
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days of cost-reimbursement, these costs were considered part of
the general cost of doing business. However, with the adoption
ofthe principal of prospective payment for diagnostic related
groups (DRGs), Medicare reimbursed these costs in a much less
precise way through a vehicle known as the indirect teaching allowance. Under this DRG system. Medicare reimburses the
hospital for its direct educational expenses in proportion to the
percentage ofits patients supported by Medicare. Moreover,
each DRG payment is increased by a percentagefigurewhich is
calculated from the number of residents and the number of beds.
In a large hospital with a large teaching program, this enhance-

"A physician surplus will exist when one
position in any US medical school goes unfilled
for lack of interest."

ment approximated 50% in 1985. In other words, if a given DRG
wananted payment of $2,000, a large teaching hospital will receive $3,000. This is known as the indirect teaching allowance,
although all parties acknowledge that it has nothing to do with
teaching. It is a means to reimburse teaching hospitals for the illdefined but additional cost of doing business in an urban location, which requires higher wages for employees and caring for
more complexly ill patients. Moreover, it is designed to crosssubsidize the care of indigent patients. Having established this
principle, the federal government adopted the Consolidated
Omnibus Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1986, and began to
rachet down the indirect teaching allowance. Continuing to employ the resident-to-bed ratio, the constant multiplier of 11.59%
has been reduced to 8.1%. Hospitals with more than 15% Medicaid patients as their clientele may receive a bonus payment
intended to compensate for the reduction of indirect teaching reimbursements. However, the important factors such as severity
and complexity of illness, higher wages, social severity, urban
location, and need for technological support have not been
addressed.
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Under this system of reimbursement, hospitals have had an
incentive to maintain large teaching programs. This will not be
tme for long, however In addition to reducing the indirect reimbursements, the COBRA legislation gives authority to the
Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) to define the costper-resident that will be directly reimbursed. Furthermore, other
payors are examining educational costs, questioning the appropriateness of reimbursing them. Most health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) associated with teaching hospitals introduce a small teaching component into the capitation rate. As
these prepayment programs come under the pressure of competition, that component is at risk for reduction and elimination.
Ultimately, one can imagine a scenario in which teaching hospitals receive only a fraction of current teaching reimbursements.
Their fixed costs, which have nothing to do with teaching and
yet are characteristic of a teaching hospital, will remain high.
It is an act of faith to assume that the large urban teaching hospitals now dominating graduate medical education will be preserved despite their inherent inefficiencies. That care for the
indigent, the complex, and the urban patient will not be continued is unimaginable, but the mechanism of support remains
uncertain at thistime.The policy that is adopted must recognize
that most of the high costs characteristic of great teaching hospitals have little to do with teaching and that elimination of teaching programs can have little impact on reducing these costs.

"Neither the specialty boards nor the RRC have
any input into the funding mechanism for
education. At times their decisions will result in
significantly increased costs to the hospital
when the education reimbursements
are
declining."

The Dissociation of Accrediting Bodies
from the F\inding Mechanism
The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
(ACGME), composed of representatives of the American Hospital Association, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies,
the American Board of Medical Specialties, the Association of
American Medical Colleges, and the American Medical Association, oversees graduate medical education in the United
States and issues general statements for the guidelines for residency programs. Their residency review committee (RRC) defines the particular requirements by specialty, the length of the
program, and may further indicate the number of residents allowed in each training program. The RRC is composed of representatives of the American Medical Association, relevant
specialty boards, and on some occasions specialty societies.
Residency review committees have substantial authority. The
ACGME and specialty boards may review mles established by
the RRC but cannot modify or veto them. Only after completion
of an approved training program may a resident sit for a certification examination within his or her specialty. Occasionally,
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differences develop between the specialty boards, who are
charged with certifying specialists, and the RRC, who approve
the training program. In such instances the specialty boards usually prevail.
Neither the specialty boards nor the RRC have any input into
the funding mechanism for education. At times their decisions
will result in significantly increased costs to the hospital when
the education reimbursements are declining. Examples of this
include 1) extending the training period for certification, 2) requiring more and more faculty subspecialists to train residents,
and 3) increasing the time spent in the ambulatory clinics relative to inpatient time (a recent development in Intemal Medicine
training).
Given the seemingly irresistable force of declining reimbursement and the seemingly immovable object of ever more
stringent residency review requirements, what is the likely outcome? To survive the residency review process, teaching institutions must have adequate patient volume, variety of pathology,
available ambulatory facilities in which to teach outpatient medicine and surgery, technology sufficient to cover the depth and
breadth of the specialty taught, and commitment by the institution and faculty to educational objectives independent of other
institutional manpower needs. Institutions with marginal patient
volume for teaching purposes, inferior facilities, or uncommitted faculty are not likely to survive the residency review process. It is possible for the collision of the inesistable force with
the immovable object to create a new entity, a quality educational program (as defined by the residency review committees)
funded by educational monies from all payors but excluding
completely the indirect cost of teaching. After all, those costs
really address a much larger societal issue; what standard of care
for the indigent and the complexly ill do the people of the United
States accept? Unfortunately, the shift to prospective payment
and DRGs has resulted in the federal govemment paying most of
indirect teaching costs which, as stated, have littie to do with the
real costs of teaching programs. Private payors and capitated
programs accept proportionately less of the burden and will undoubtedly continue this practice given the competition for subscribers. Accordingly, the fate of teaching hospitals rests
increasingly with an unpredictable political process over which
they have relatively little control.

Politicizing the Graduate Medical
Education Program is Hazardous
The COBRA established a council for graduate medical education whose purpose is to advise the Secretary of Health and
Human Services regarding the supply of physicians in the
United States, the cunent and future needs for physicians in primary care and the specialties, issues related to foreign medical
graduates, federal policies concemingfinancialsupport of medical training and appropriate programs for hospitals, and medical schools with respect to the above. This council is to issue its
first report to the Secretary and the Congress by July I , 1988,
and will report every three years thereafter The proposed membership of 17 includes the Assistant Secretary for Health; the
Administrator for Health Care Financing Administration; and
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ten members appointed by the Secretary from health care providers, national and specialty physician organizations, schools
of medicine, organizations for foreign medical graduates, and
hospitals that provide graduate medical education. An additional four members are appointed by the Secretary to represent
health insurers, business, and labor The consequences may be
profound.
Another attempt on the part of political bodies to regulate
physician manpower in the United States was made in the late
1960s and early 1970s. The perceived issue then was "too few
doctors" with the contention that the medical profession was in-

"Current attempts to reduce physician manpower
will not simply retrace steps and restore higher
standards. Instead, both the better and inferior
medical schools are being asked to reduce their
class enrollment."

tentionally limiting competition to maintain high fees. Accordingly,financialpressure was put on medical schools to increase
their enrollment, and several new medical schools were created.
The typical class size increased from 70 to frequentiy over 200,
and the number of schools expanded to 127. Rather than reducing health care costs, the explosion in the number of physicians
resulting from these maneuvers brought both higher fees per service provided and a great many more services provided. Political bodies perceive a physician manpower surplus that now
needs to be reduced. What in fact had happened was an acrossthe-board lowering of standards for the profession. Medical
school applicants who formerly would have been rejected were
being accepted, and medical schools that previously could not
have met the requirements were being accredited. However, the
cunent attempts to reduce physician manpower will not simply
retrace steps and restore higher standards. Instead, both the better and inferior medical schools are being asked to reduce their
class enrollment. Very possibly the same scenario will be played
at the graduate medical education level as the federal govemment and other payors establish regulatory bodies charged with
reduction of "physician surplus" as their sole purpose. Currently, each graduate from an ACGME Liasion Committee for
Medical Education approved medical school examines available
residency programs in his or her discipline and applies to the
most attractive one through the National Residency Match Program. Programs most attractive to graduates generally are filled
by the most attractive graduates. In microcosm this is a free market system in which issues of salary and fringe benefits play a
minor role and quality education programs a major one. Good
residents are good business for hospitals. Not only do they provide better patient care but also improve marketing, conduct
more cost-effective practice, and contribute to efficient hospital
management. Given their constrained resources, hospitals will
nonetheless seek to preserve residency programs that are capable of attracting quality residents. On the other hand, if resi-
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dency programs are regulated by the government or other
payors, inferior programs will almost certainly be supported and
the quality programs diluted. Medical school graduates have a
much greater incentive and ability to evaluate individual residency programs than would any regulatory agency.

Physician Manpower Issues or Pseudo-Issues
Virtually every article in the lay and professional literature
about physician manpower in the United States accepts that
there are too many physicians, particularly too many subspecialists. In 1959 there were about 140 physicians per 100,000
population; currentiy there are 200 physicians per 100,000. It is
anticipated that at the tum of the century there will be 280 physicians per 100,000 population. The number of active physicians
(MD and DO) in the continental United States was 326,200 in
1970, 467,000 in 1981, and is projected to rise to 594,600 by
1990 and to 706,500 by the year 2000. The Bureau of Health
Professions (5) projects that the ratio of primary care physicians
to the population will increase from 84 per 100,000 population
in 1981 to 115 per 100,000 population in the year 2000. Clearly,
the number of doctors is increasing. Less clear is whether a physician surplus exists. One could define a physician surplus as
existing only when an available first-year position in any US
medical school remains unfilled for lack of interest. That act will
incorporate all of the financial and professional implications of
competition and opportunity. Other definitions of physician surplus are at best speculative. Furthermore, these speculations are
limited in several ways. For example, any body appointed by a
state to examine the problem of physician surplus tends to deal
with issues within that state. A council convened by the federal
govemment tends to limit its considerations to our country, yet
the United States represents a world resource for medical care.
Almost certainly the world needs either more physicians or a
more equitable distribution of physicians. What should be the
role of the United States in addressing issues of health care in the
third world? Consider the hazards of attempting to project manpower needs. How many infectious disease specialists were
needed before 1981? Did this change after 1981, the year that
AIDS was first described by the Centers for Disease Control?
What medical resources will be needed to handle this 20th cen-

"Good residents are good business for hospitals.
Not only do they provide better patient care but
also improve marketing, conduct more costeffective practice, and contribute to efficient
hospital management."

tury plague? What types of physicians are needed to treat these
patients? Although virtually everyone agrees that there are now
too many cardiologists, if the intracoronary use of thrombolytic
agents should become the standard of care for every myocardial
infarction in the United States, will there be a surplus? The free

Graduate Medical Education—Leach

265

market altemative to regulation is most attractive. Young physicians can best define what type of physician they want to become, primary versus specialist; and if specialist, what type of
specialist? They will incorporate economic and professional realities into their decision. Any regulatory process could impede
and almost certainly not improve that mechanism for regulation
of physician manpower.
1 acknowledge that this article expresses opinions more than
facts. My wish is to focus attention on some cunent issues in
graduate medical education. As society, the government, the
payors, and the profession scmtinize funding for graduate medical education, they must also address the issues of care for the
poor and severely ill. As training programs attempt to do more
with less, manyfineinstitutions may decide to get out ofthe ed-
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ucation business completely. History's lessons about the hazards
of manpower regulation in medicine should not be ignored.

References
1. Culliton BJ. Medicine as business: Are doctors entrepreneurs? Science
1986;233:1032-3.
2. Prescription for change: Report of the task force on academic health centers. The Commonwealth Fund, 1983:1-9,111-15-22.
3. Medical education: Institution, characteristic and program: A background
paper. Association of American Medical Colleges, September 1986.
4. Vanselow NA. Academic health centers: Can they survive? Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 1986:55-64.
5. Drabek J, Sprattey E. Projections of physician supply in the US. United
States Department of Health and Human Services Bureau of Health Professions.
ODAM Staff Report No 3-85, March 1985.

Graduate Medical Education—Leach

